Singer then states that it would seem to follow that we ought to work full time in order to maximise our output and to relieve the misery of others. There is no issue of being affected by any bystanders or not knowing what kind of assistance to deliver, and he can be confident that there are minimal unforeseen and undesirable consequences resulting from his efforts.
However, this notion of value is flawed as value does not exist in the object itself but rather the amount of sacrifice one is willing to put for it.
The money provided might end up in the hands of children manipulated by bad adults or the government for example. In donating to countries, the agent cannot say the same about the level of certainty with regards to the help he is providing. We cannot say for sure if the suffering of others is thoroughly undeserved.
Singer rebuts this by not stating what the cause of this poverty cycle is but instead says that if we believe in other outlets, then we should still donate to them.
There is an adequate amount of food produced, but it is more often poor governmental policies that result in an inefficient allocation of resources and hence resulting in poverty.
While we are entitled to morally judge inaction in the case of the drowning child, we cannot judge as harshly for the case of overseas aid as Singer attempts to do so here.
Singer also anticipates the objection that there other people who are standing around not doing anything anyway. As such, an object whose value is posited based on personal preference can have infinitely many values. He asserts that even when the implications of working full time have been taken into account, such as the unpleasantness of work overload, it still stands that we should give as much as we can.
Singer anticipates objections and the first of which is that as the drowning child is nearer to us than the starving Bengali, the moral obligation is therefore seemingly reduced. While he asserts consistency, it would be hard for anybody to accept that it is as easy as it seems to compare between murder and relief of famines against, say, doing community work and providing relief for famines.
In response to proposed arguments from writers that morality would breakdown if the ideology suggested by Singer was adopted, he counters that it is like saying that if we tell people not to murder and help relieve famines, they will do neither; if we tell people not to murder and that it is a good thing to help relieve famines though it is not wrong not to do so, they will at least not murder.
We can revisit the drowning child analogy and argue against his first and second points that it is more reasonable for a person to be cynical about overseas aid than diving straight in to save a drowning child. In view of his points so far, Singer is aware of the fact that our moral frameworks would be affected because giving is traditionally considered a form of charity, not a form of duty.
There is a correlation between poor governance and poor nations, and we can be skeptical especially when the money would go to places with poor governmental policies.
Singer, anticipatedly, puts forth a moderate version where one does only need give substantially, providing an allowance for variations in personal judgments of moral significance.
Secondly, much of wealth is tied down in assets. Here, Singer commits the fallacy of hasty generalisation, as he attempts to appeal to our emotions by comparing two extreme cases — murder and providing relief — and his example, biased as it is, is barely applicable in the realm of daily dealings.
Singer begins by saying that assistance has been inadequate as richer countries prioritise development above preventing starvation. Singer attacks this by reiterating his point, based on the principle of comparable moral significance, that we ought to donate our luxury money, which is any income beyond marginal utility, as otherwise spending it on clothes to look good rather than keep warm would be preventing another person from being liberated from starvation.Famine, Affluence, and Morality by Peter Singer.
Famine, Affluence, and Morality by Peter Singer The Elements of Reason #8 1. Use two or three sentences to state the main purpose or argument in this article. In other words, what is the argument the author is making?
(This should be a specific argument. Peter Singer – “Famine, Affluence, and Morality” Dora Crawford Prof.
David Tredinnick 12/19/ When it comes to the article "Famine, Affluence, and Morality" mostly argues about not one but more than several things. In some point most people can agree with his arguments unlike others whom may not see his point of view.
In “Famine, Affluence, and Morality,” Peter Singer discusses that people are dying in Bengal from a lack of food, shelter, and medical care. Singer discusses in detail how poverty and war have created a large number of refugees that require millions just to.
Outline of PETER SINGER: “Famine, Affluence, and Morality” Singer’s main argument: 1. Lack of food & shelter & medicine is bad. This does not support the status quo (a mere 1% going to famine relief).
Instead, it opens the door to our discussion of how far to increase relief.
We should give to the level that does not reduce spending. In his work Famine, Affluence and Morality, Peter Singer presents an argument that we of the developed world, can and ought to do more for the developing nations to alleviate their poverty.
This paper explores Peter Singer’s argument, in Famine, Affluence, and Morality, that we have morally required obligations to those in need. The explanation of his argument and conclusion, if accepted, would dictate changes to our lifestyle as well as our conceptions of duty and charity, and would be particularly demanding of the affluent.Download